Assaf Heller[1]
In a span of less than a month in the summer of 2026, three major decisions were made regarding “sixth‑generation fighter” programs – a concept centered on developing a system of systems that integrates manned and unmanned aircraft through a network enabling joint operations. Although the decisions were independent and very different from one another, together they offer an opportunity to understand the considerations shaping airpower for the coming decades.
On June 8, Germany and France officially terminated the FCAS program, which had been under design for nine years and had already consumed roughly €4 billion. On July 3, the UK, Italy, and Japan decided to add £4.6 billion to fund the detailed design phase of their parallel program, GCAP. Between these two decisions, the United States chose to advance to serial production of the first phase of its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program and selected companies to continue developing autonomous software for CCA operations.
Before diving into the programs and the decisions made, it is important to note that additional players are active in the global sixth‑generation aircraft arena. China has been flying prototypes of its sixth‑generation fighters, the J‑36 and J‑50, for over a year, though secrecy makes it difficult to assess their true status. Turkey and India are developing fifth‑generation fighters, which the U.S. and European nations view as a stepping‑stone toward sixth‑generation capabilities. Combat drones designed to operate alongside manned aircraft — or independently — are being developed in Australia, Sweden, South Korea, Turkey, India, and others. The particular interest in the three recent decisions stems from the fact that they were made by countries that have a comprehensive view of sixth‑generation aircraft: they are developing both the manned platforms and the unmanned systems intended to operate with them.
What happened with the three programs?
FCAS
The goal of the FCAS program was to develop a new stealth fighter, highly autonomous unmanned systems (“Remote Carriers,” led by MBDA), and a broad combat cloud enabling manned‑unmanned teaming (MUMT) to build shared situational awareness, improve survivability, and enhance multi‑mission capability. What ultimately caused the program's collapse was not a technological challenge but disagreements in two areas:
Industrial workshare: Dassault demanded 80% of the fighter‑aircraft workshare, while the original agreement defined an equal split — with implications for export rights.
Operational requirements: France needed a relatively light aircraft capable of operating from an aircraft carrier, while Germany required a heavier, long‑range strike platform.
Germany abandoned the program despite not currently having an alternative for a future manned fighter. However, it is independently developing two major components aligned with FCAS principles:
CFSN (Combat Fighter System Nucleus): a connectivity backbone for German Air Force aircraft.
Several CCA‑type drones: including MBDA’s 400‑kg Remote Carrier, Airbus’s 6‑ton subsonic drone, and a heavier stealth drone also developed by Airbus.
Several fighter types may eventually integrate into Germany’s future concept: Eurofighter Typhoon (4th-generation), F‑35 (5th generation), and potentially GCAP (6th generation) or a future German‑Spanish‑Swedish development. France continues independently with its future fighter program and, like Germany, plans to integrate uncrewed systems with 4th-generation Rafale aircraft in the coming years, well before sixth‑generation fighters are available.
GCAP
At the same time as FCAS fighter project was cancelled, the sixth‑generation program of the UK, Italy, and Japan – GCAP – received £4.6 billion for its detailed design phase. Like FCAS, GCAP is intended to be a system of systems, including a crewed stealth fighter, uncrewed platforms, and a communication network similar in principle to FCAS’s combat cloud. However, the programs differ in several notable ways:
The crewed fighter is developed by a single industrial consortium (Edgewing), rather than two competing prime contractors.
Uncrewed systems are developed separately by each partner nation.
A central element of the program is a shared architecture based on ISANKE (sensing and non‑kinetic effects) and ICS (integrated communications).
The program places special emphasis on giving partner nations freedom in operations and modifications
United States: NGAD and CCA
The U.S. fighter‑force development plan includes two main components:
Crewed fighters: in addition to existing F‑15, F‑16 (4th-generation), and F‑35 (5th generation), the future F‑47 (6th generation) is under development. These aircraft are expensive, around $300 million each.
Large numbers of uncrewed CCA aircraft: far cheaper (around $30 million) and progressing rapidly.
In mid‑June 2026, the U.S. decided to advance to serial production of the first phase of the program, with the FQ‑44A (Anduril) and FQ‑42A (GA). Nine suppliers are already competing for the second phase, including Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman, which lost in the first round.
A central emphasis of the American CCA concept is modularity (Modular Open System Approach). Autonomy and communication layers are developed separately from the CCA platforms by different manufacturers, enabling flexibility in integrating various CCA platforms into the same architecture. This provides advantages in procurement – freeing the U.S. from dependence on specific platform manufacturers – and advantages in operational capability, allowing CCAs to be integrated with existing fighters without waiting for sixth‑generation aircraft. For example, the F‑35 has already demonstrated MUMT with the MQ‑20 drone.
The common thread
Despite the differences between the three cases, they all point to the same insight: The long‑term value and strategic control of airpower lie not in the platforms themselves, but in the architecture – the communications backbone, the networked operational capability, and the autonomy of the aircraft.
Aircraft remain important, of course, but air forces will operate a variety of platforms – large and small, expensive and cheap, crewed and uncrewed, fast and slow, stealthy and non‑stealthy. The greatest value will come from the ability to connect them into an effective airpower system of systems. Architecture matters not only because it enables greater performance from each platform, but also because it provides flexibility in force employment and force buildup. These characteristics make architecture a critical national asset that countries seek to control independently.
This recognition of architecture’s primacy is evident in all three cases: Germany’s willingness to forgo a sixth‑generation crewed fighter in the near term while prioritizing CFSN connectivity and flexible integration of uncrewed systems; GCAP’s emphasis on ISANKE and ICS, open architecture, and national freedom of modification; and the U.S. focus on modularity and decoupling crewed and uncrewed platforms.
Architecture and national independence in controlling it are likely to shape the global market. Whoever controls the architecture – standards, compatibility, and the communication backbone – will hold a long‑term barrier to entry for platform manufacturers. In such a market, platforms will need to be flexible and compatible with the customer’s preferred architecture, which is increasingly feasible thanks to advances in computing. The combination of flexible platform procurement and a trend toward acquiring numerous relatively inexpensive platforms will likely make the platform market a buyer’s market – more competitive, more volatile, with more relevant sellers and greater freedom of choice for customers.
Conclusion
The decisions made last summer regarding sixth‑generation fighter development programs pushed airpower another step toward a future in which the emphasis shifts from specific platforms to architecture. “Which aircraft should we buy?” remains an important question, but in the long term it has become somewhat less decisive. Airpower development processes increasingly prioritize connectivity and algorithmic capabilities, enabling higher operational value through joint action among diverse systems and effective exploitation of their relative advantages.
[1] Heller, A. (2026, September). Sixth Generation Fighter Aircraft: One Summer, Three Decisions, and the Future of Airpower (Aerial Insights No. 7/2026). Elrom Center for the Study of Air and Space Policy and Strategy, Tel Aviv University.