Confronting Air Defense: Trends and Implications for Israel's Air Force and Civil Aviation

The Strategic Implications of Evolving Air Defense Systems on the Israeli Air Force and Civil Aviation

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) and civil aviation to and from Israel hold immense strategic importance. Over the past decade, two major trends have been developing that threaten the freedom of flight and operational freedom of both the IAF and civil aviation, carrying potentially far-reaching strategic implications.

Two Major Trends of Change

1. Technological Advancements in Air Defense SystemsFor decades, an ongoing competition has existed between air power and air defense. At times, air defense capabilities prevail—such as after the War of Attrition, when "the missile bent the airplane's wing" (in the words of former IAF Commander Ezer Weizman)—and at other times, air power prevails, as seen in the First Lebanon War and the First Gulf War, where air defenses were decisively defeated from the air. Over the past decade, the efficiency and ranges of various air defense components have grown significantly: detection systems, Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), jamming capabilities, interceptor aircraft, and naval air defense systems.  This accumulation of changes creates a paradigm shift, threatening to gradually alter the balance of power between air defense and air power over the coming decades.

2. Doctrinal Shifts in Air Defense EmploymentA new doctrine is taking shape wherein air defense is utilized during routine times as part of a strategic dialogue, aimed at achieving deterrence and establishing rules of the game to restrict the employment of air power. A significant portion of its implementation relies on "soft" (non-kinetic) tools for jamming and harassment without shooting down aircraft (particularly avoiding the downing of manned aircraft) in order to minimize the risk of escalation. The aerial domain is conducive to the employment of such tools, and countries like Russia, China, and Iran are actively utilizing them.

Strategic Implications for the Current Decade

These two trends could lead to a strategic shift during routine operations within the current decade. The increased ranges and efficiency of air defenses, coupled with a willingness to employ them, will pose a threat to the IAF's freedom of flight in areas currently considered "clean" of threats—over Israeli territory and over the Mediterranean Sea.  To preserve freedom of flight, the IAF will need to develop new capabilities: "soft" tools for jamming air defense systems and countering enemy jamming, area defense measures for aircraft operating within Israel and over the sea, and, crucially, a systemic capability to manage a continuous campaign to preserve freedom of flight. This campaign must also incorporate non-military elements such as diplomacy, public diplomacy (Hasbara), and partnerships.

A parallel strategic shift may occur due to the threat to civil aviation. The expanding ranges of air defense systems and their availability to terrorist and paramilitary organizations will enable them to pose a tangible threat to civil aviation deep within Israel and along its flight corridors. Addressing this challenge will require an organizational perspective that extends beyond the IAF, which is currently the sole body dealing with the air defense threat.

The strategic implications of these trends are particularly significant due to Israel's unique geographic characteristics, which differ from those of the United States or Western Europe: Israel is a small country, allowing SAM and jamming systems to be positioned close to its borders while creating a tangible threat to aircraft deep within its territory.

Long-Term Force Design and Technological Opportunities

Over time, a strategic shift may also develop regarding the IAF's ability to serve as a central component in warfare. A leap in air defense capabilities, leading to a shift in the balance of power, will impact the feasibility of operating the IAF in its current format—a force whose strike capability relies primarily on manned fighter jets carrying heavy munitions.

The air defense transformation requiring this shift is only expected in 2-3 decades, allowing time to prepare. American concepts developed against future air defenses rely heavily on a massive inventory of long-range missiles, an extensive fleet of low-signature (stealth) UAVs, "6th generation" aircraft, and cyber-attack capabilities against air defense systems.  Acquiring such vast inventories and advanced aircraft requires immense resources. The suitable solution for Israel combines its current operational concept—which involves an opening strike to achieve air superiority, followed by operations in a reduced-threat environment—with technological solutions drawn from the American concept.

An opening strike to achieve sufficient air superiority can be based on new technological solutions, with the aim of enabling effective force employment later in the campaign from shorter ranges and with fewer resources.

Technological trends do not only pose risks; they also present new opportunities. The reliance of modern air defenses on networking and software provides a variety of opportunities for intelligence generation and the disruption of air defense capabilities. Information technologies, connectivity, autonomy, miniaturization, and cyber warfare are critical tools in developing air defense capabilities, but they are equally vital tools for developing the means to counter them.

This study is part of a research program addressing the force design of the IAF for the coming decade, seeking to lay a deep knowledge foundation for decision-making processes in this field. This program includes studies analyzing anticipated changes in the concepts, operational methods, and capabilities of enemies and adversaries, and their implications for the IAF; studies analyzing the impact of IDF force design processes on the IAF; and studies analyzing major technological shifts and their broad implications on the characteristics of aerial warfare.