China's Air Arsenal and its Implications for the Israeli Air Force

This research examines the development of Chinese weaponry relevant to the Israeli Air Force (IAF) battlefield, and its implications for the IAF's force design and employment under various scenarios involving the proliferation of these weapons to the Middle East.

China's presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has grown over the past decade and is expected to continue expanding, including in the security domain. The study describes the processes that have transformed the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) into a modern force operating advanced weaponry, enabling defensive and offensive operations at long ranges and introducing new capabilities in the aerial domain. The convergence of China's growing presence in MENA and its development in the military and technological spheres provides its Middle Eastern partners with new opportunities to improve the quality of their operational weaponry and acquire necessary advanced technologies.

To date, the export of Chinese weaponry to Middle Eastern countries has been limited and focused on niche capabilities: attack UAVs in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE; coastal defense missiles in Iran and Lebanon; radars in Syria, and the like. In recent years, Chinese penetration into the Middle East has increased in economic and diplomatic aspects, and Chinese military technology has advanced significantly, even surpassing that of Russia in several areas (including UAVs, sensors, and space technologies). In light of this, it is possible that the IAF will encounter Chinese platforms or technology in the Middle East in the future.

To establish policy on this matter, it is necessary to identify significant military capabilities that may reach the arena, possessing unique characteristics not encapsulated within the existing reference threat of Russian and Iranian weapon systems. This examination highlights several key areas:

• Export of Advanced Weaponry: One area is the export of advanced weaponry from China, with an emphasis on 4.5-generation aircraft equipped with long-range active missiles and advanced sensor suites (AESA radars and IRST systems); dual-mode seekers (IR and radar) for surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles; and air defense systems, highlighting long-range SAMs whose technical characteristics differ from those of Russian SAMs, and potentially anti-ballistic missile interception systems in the future.
• Export of Technologies: A second area is the export of technologies from China as part of cooperation agreements with Middle Eastern countries. Highly influential Chinese technologies could include communications, AI, space, and cyber. The lack of separation between civilian and military technologies, a common occurrence in China, may allow regional states to develop military applications using accessible advanced Chinese technologies. Technology export can be executed through knowledge transfer or as part of component and weapons transfers. One element China exports is manufacturing capacity, such as establishing UAV factories in the client state as part of UAV procurement deals. Consequently, arms procurement deals also facilitate the acquisition of Chinese technologies.
• Chinese Military Presence: A third area is Chinese military presence, primarily consisting of Chinese naval vessels, and potentially leading to a permanent presence at seaport bases in the future. Co-location in the same domain creates the potential for friction between IAF aircraft and Chinese military forces, even if undesired by both sides.

China's current involvement in the Middle East remains limited in its impact. However, it is crucial to maintain an adequate intelligence picture across four domains: procurement deals, technological characteristics of relevant Chinese weaponry, the integration of Chinese technologies into systems developed in Iran, and Chinese naval presence in the IAF's areas of interest.