Boo or Boom? Russia's Opening Airstrikes in Ukraine through the Lens of Moscow's Strategic Design

On the first day of the war in Ukraine, Russia launched approximately 100 ballistic and cruise missiles from ground-, air-, and sea-based platforms against roughly 30 targets across the country. This study provides an initial analysis of the characteristics and effectiveness of this “opening strike.” The analysis examines both the strategic and operational logic behind the strike and its tactical execution, including target selection and missile accuracy.

Strategic Logic and Cognitive Effect

The opening strike targeted airbases, ammunition depots, air defense systems, and a seaport. These targets reflect the Kremlin’s apparent strategic objective of rapidly destabilizing Ukraine’s leadership and military command while initially attempting to limit civilian casualties.

Rather than fully destroying these facilities, the strike appears to have been designed to produce a cognitive effect. Simultaneous attacks across Ukrainian territory were intended to create confusion among political and military leadership regarding the direction of the Russian offensive, demonstrate Russian military power to the Ukrainian population, and deter Western intervention. In particular, strikes in western Ukraine may have been intended to signal Russia’s willingness to escalate and to discourage the transfer of external military assistance.

Within this framework, long-range precision missiles played an important role in Russia’s concept of “deterrence through the limited use of force.” Because many of these systems also have nuclear-capable variants, their use can serve as a signal of Russian resolve while simultaneously conveying a desire to avoid broader escalation.

Operational Shortcomings and the “Intelligence–Strike Complex”

Despite the scope of the opening strike, a significant portion of Ukraine’s air defense systems, aircraft, and UAVs remained intact. Moreover, Russia did not mount an effective follow-on campaign to rapidly achieve air superiority after the initial strike.

Russian military doctrine in recent years has emphasized the development of an “intelligence–strike complex”—a capability enabling continuous precision strikes based on real-time intelligence. However, several characteristics of the opening strike suggest limitations in Russia’s ability to fully implement this concept. These include the relatively limited scale of the attack, the focus on fixed targets, and the absence of sustained strike waves. Subsequent Russian air operations during the war have also been characterized by limited employment, weak integration with other forces, and the failure to achieve air superiority.

Together, these factors suggest that Russian operational concepts may exceed the current capabilities of the Russian military in terms of precision strike capacity and operational integration.

Tactical Analysis: Missile Accuracy and Operational Assumptions

An analysis of strikes against Ukrainian airbases—based on a sample of approximately 21 missiles from the opening strike—indicates that the accuracy of Russian missiles is relatively low compared with standard Western GPS-guided munitions. The analysis suggests a 50–60 percent probability of impact within approximately 10 meters of the target and a 30–40 percent probability of a near miss within 30–50 meters.

Several factors may explain these results. First, the Russian military may face limitations in the number of precision-guided missiles it can deploy simultaneously, as well as constraints in its munitions inventory. Second, gaps in real-time intelligence may have hindered the effective implementation of the “intelligence–strike complex.” Finally, the strike appears to have been influenced by flawed assumptions, including expectations of limited resistance from the Ukrainian military and population and the anticipation of a rapid ground advance that would quickly secure key areas of the country.