Integration or Independence? The Use of Air Power in Ground Combat

Over the past decade, debate over the future and viability of ground maneuver in the IDF  has intensified. This discussion reflects hesitation to deploy large ground formations since the Second Lebanon War, as well as growing doubts, both inside and outside the military, about the effectiveness of maneuver against Israel’s first-circle adversaries. At the same time, questions persist regarding the political leadership’s willingness to authorize large-scale ground operations given concerns about casualties and their impact on public support.

These debates have become increasingly relevant as the IDF seeks to adapt its force structure and operational concepts to a changing battlefield characterized by dispersed enemies, advanced precision weapons, and complex urban environments.

From Combined Arms to “Fused Warfare”

In a lecture delivered at the Institute for National Security Studies near the end of his tenure, former IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi presented an ambitious vision for the future of maneuver. According to Kochavi, the IDF’s capabilities are undergoing a transformation based on what he described as the “industrialization of precision.”

This concept relies on a massive flow of real-time intelligence integrated across the IDF’s sensor network and delivered directly to maneuvering forces. Intelligence collected from multiple platforms is fused into a common operational picture that exposes enemy targets.

This intelligence advantage is paired with powerful multi-layered fire capabilities—from air and ground platforms—applied rapidly and with high intensity to neutralize enemy forces and facilitate maneuver.

Kochavi argued that this transformation is made possible by the digital revolution. Systems such as the Digital Army Program (Zayad 750) connect battlefield units and enable rapid target designation and engagement. A target identified by a ground unit can quickly appear across multiple attack platforms, allowing commanders to assign the appropriate asset—whether an F-15 aircraft, an attack helicopter, or another platform—and strike within minutes.

In Kochavi’s words, this represents more than traditional combined-arms warfare; it represents “fused warfare,” in which air and ground capabilities operate as a fully integrated system.

The Challenge of the Modern Battlefield

This vision seeks to address a fundamental problem of contemporary warfare. Today’s adversaries are difficult to defeat decisively. They are often dispersed, embedded within civilian populations, and lack clear strategic centers of gravity whose destruction would produce a decisive victory.

At the same time, these adversaries possess increasingly sophisticated firepower that threatens both maneuvering forces and the Israeli home front. Military operations also unfold in an environment where domestic legitimacy, international opinion, and public perception influence the outcome of campaigns almost as much as battlefield achievements.

Within this context, the integration between air power and ground maneuver has become a central operational challenge.

The Limits of the Current Model

Under the IDF’s current structure, air power remains largely controlled by the Air Force and allocated to ground forces as needed. Maneuvering commanders rely heavily on intelligence processed in rear headquarters and on aerial firepower coordinated through centralized strike cells.

While technological advances promise to improve coordination through digital networks and AI-supported decision tools, this model raises questions about its resilience under combat conditions. The fog of war, operational friction, casualties, and communication bottlenecks may limit the effectiveness of highly centralized systems.

Although ground forces increasingly deploy small drones and tactical UAVs, these systems typically operate at short ranges. Most aerial intelligence and strike capabilities at the divisional level and below still depend on assets controlled by the Air Force.

A Possible Alternative: Greater Ground Force Autonomy

Historical experience with close air support and the practical limitations of technology suggest that a different approach may also deserve consideration.

One alternative would be to increase the operational independence of ground forces by assigning a larger share of aerial assets directly to ground commanders. Many militaries already operate similar models through organic army aviation units.

Under such a structure, ground forces would become less dependent on intelligence and strike resources allocated from centralized headquarters. Instead, those assets would serve as supporting capabilities rather than prerequisites for maneuver.

Leveraging Emerging Technologies

Technological developments—particularly in unmanned aerial vehicles, sensors, and localized air defense systems—create new opportunities for implementing such an approach.

Unlike the highly complex systems required for full battlefield fusion, many of these technologies are already mature and widely deployed. Their use may reduce reliance on centralized networks that could become critical points of failure during combat.

Expanding the aerial capabilities available to ground forces—including larger UAV platforms such as the Hermes-450 (“Zik”) and similar systems—could significantly enhance the stability and responsiveness of maneuver operations. Local air defense systems protecting maneuvering forces would further increase operational resilience.

Assigning the Ground Forces Command greater responsibility for developing its own UAV capabilities would also allow for a more coherent operational concept for land warfare.

Implications for the Air Force and the General Staff

Such a shift would not diminish the importance of the Israeli Air Force. On the contrary, it could allow the Air Force to focus more intensively on missions where it has clear strategic advantages, including deep-strike operations, third-circle missions, air superiority, and defense against missile and rocket threats.

The Air Force would continue to contribute to land warfare in areas where its capabilities are uniquely effective—such as battlefield interdiction, attacks on heavily fortified targets, strikes on enemy fire arrays, and disruption of logistical networks.

For the IDF General Staff, the challenge will be to manage this transition. On the one hand, it must support the development of stronger ground capabilities. On the other, it may need to reconsider the current centralized framework governing the allocation of air power and the development of UAV capabilities.

Balancing these considerations will be critical as the IDF continues to adapt its force design to the evolving realities of modern warfare.